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Abstract
A (t, n)− threshold signature scheme enables distributed signing
among n players such that any subgroup of size t can sign, whereas any
group with fewer players cannot. Our goal is to produce signatures that
are compatible with an existing centralized signature scheme: the key
generation and signature algorithm are replaced by a communication
protocol between the parties, but the verification algorithm remains
identical to that of a signature issued using the centralized algorithm.
Starting from the threshold schemes for the ECDSA signature due to
R. Gennaro and S. Goldfeder [16], we present the first protocol that
supports multiparty signatures with an offline participant during the
Key Generation Phase, without relying on a trusted third party.
Following well-established approaches, we prove our scheme secure
against adaptive malicious adversaries.
1 Introduction
A (t, n)-threshold signature scheme enables distributed signing among n
players such that any subgroup of size t can sign, whereas any group with
fewer players cannot. The first Threshold Multi-Party Signature Scheme
was a protocol for ECDSA signatures proposed by Gennaro et al. [18] where
t+ 1 parties out of 2t+ 1 were required to sign a message. Later MacKenzie
and Reiter proposed and then improved another scheme [33, 34], which has
later been furthermore enhanced [11, 30, 12]. The first scheme supporting
a general (t, n)-threshold was proposed in [17], improved in [6] and finally
in [16]. A parallel approach has been taken by Lindell and Nof in [31].
Currently there is a large effort of standardization for threshold signatures,
as can be seen in [7].
The goal of this line of research is to produce signatures that are com-
patible with an existing centralized signature scheme. In this context, the
1
ar
X
iv
:2
00
7.
04
03
6v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  8
 Ju
l 2
02
0
key-generation and signature algorithms are replaced by a communication
protocol between the parties, while the verification algorithm remains iden-
tical to that of a signature issued using the centralized algorithm.
The need for joint signatures arises frequently in the world of cryptocur-
rencies, where digital signatures determine ownership rights and control over
assets, meaning that protection and custody of private keys is of paramount
importance. A particularly sensitive issue is the resiliency against key loss,
since there is no central authority that can restore ownership of a digital
token once the private key of the wallet is lost. A common solution is to
rely on a trusted third-party custodian that takes responsibility of key man-
agement, but this kind of centralization may form single points of failure
and juicy targets for criminal takeovers, and there have already been plenty
of examples of said events in the past [9].
Therefore, we are interested in the approach that distributes the con-
trol over the wallet through multi-signature schemes, in particular with
threshold-like policies. The simplest approach to this solution are multi-
sig wallets (available for some cryptocurrencies, like Bitcoin [38]) where the
signatures are normal ones, but funds may be moved out of that wallet only
with a sufficient number of signatures corresponding to a prescribed set of
public keys. The main disadvantage to this approach is that it is not sup-
ported by every cryptocurrency (e.g. Ethereum [8]), moreover such wallets
are very easily identifiable.
However in these applications the recovery party (that allows to recover
the funds in case of key loss) is usually not willing to sustain the cost of
frequent online collaboration. For example a bank may safely guard a piece
of the secret key but it is inconvenient and quite costly to make it participate
in the enrollment of every user. Therefore, in this paper we start from [16]
to propose a protocol in which the recovery party is involved only once (in
a preliminary set-up), and afterwards it is not involved until a lost account
must be recovered.
Organization We present some preliminaries in Section 2, we describe
our protocol in Section 3. Another practical problem is to derive many
keys from a single secret, for example to efficiently manage multiple wallets.
Therefore, we provide also an extension of our protocol that can work with
key-derivation in Section 3.6. In Section 4 we state the security property
that we claim for our protocol, with a proof similar to that in [16], which
however requires several subtle modifications to tackle the off-line situation.
The adaption of our proof to the key-derivation extension is cumbersome
but easy and so we do not provide it here. Finally in Section 5 we draw our
conclusions.
2
2 Preliminaries
In this section we present some preliminary definitions and primitives that
will be used in the protocol and its proof of security.
In the following when we say that an algorithm is efficient we mean that
it runs in (expected) polynomial time in the size of the input, possibly using
a random source.
2.1 Assumptions
Our proof is based on two assumptions: the Decisional Diffie-Hellman [5]
(from now on DDH) and the RSA [42] assumption.
Definition 2.1 (DDH Assumption). Let G be a cyclic group with generator
g and order n. Let a, b, c random elements of Zn. The Decisional Diffie-
Hellman assumption, from now on DDH assumption, states that no efficient
algorithm can distinguish between the two distributions (g, ga, gb, gab) and
(g, ga, gb, gc).
Definition 2.2 (RSA Assumption). Let N = pq with both p, q safe primes.
Let e be an integer such that e and φ(N) are coprime.
• The RSA assumption states that given a random element s ∈ Z∗N no
efficient algorithm can find x such that xe = s mod N .
• The Strong RSA assumption states that given a random element s ∈ Z∗N
no efficient algorithm can find x, e0 6= 1 such that xe0 = s mod N .
2.2 Zero-Knowledge Proofs
In the protocol various Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKP) [20] are used to en-
force the respect of the passages prescribed by the specifications. In fact in
the proof of security we can exploit the soundness of these sub-protocols to
extract valuable information from the adversary, and their zero-knowledge
property to simulate correct executions even without knowing some secrets.
We can do so because we see the adversary as a (black-box) algorithm that
we can call on arbitrary input, and crucially we have the faculty of rewind
its execution.
In particular we use ZKP of Knowledge (ZKPoK) to guarantee the usage
of secret values that properly correspond to the public counterpart: the
Schnorr protocol for discrete logarithms (see [44] and Appendix A.1) and
an Integer-Factorization Proof (see [41] and Appendix A.2) for Paillier keys.
The soundness property of a ZKPoK guarantees that the adversary must
know the secret input, and opportune rewinds and manipulations of the
adversary’s execution during the proof allows us to extract those secrets
and use them in the simulation. Conversely exploiting the zero-knowledge
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property we can trick the adversary in believing that we know our secrets
even if we don’t, thus we still obtain a correct simulation of our protocol
form the adversary’s point of view.
The other ZKP used is a range proof (see [16, 33] and appendix A.3) that
guarantees a proper execution of the share conversion protocol of Section 2.5,
however the same discussion of [16], Section 5 (about how the security is not
significatively affected removing this proof) applies to our protocol.
2.3 Paillier Cryptosystem
In our protocol we use the Paillier cryptosystem, a partially homomorphic
asymmetric encryption scheme presented by P. Paillier in [39]. Suppose
that Bob wants to send an encrypted message to Alice. The workflow of the
algorithm is the following:
• Key Generation:
1. Alice chooses two large primes p, q uniformly at random, such
that gcd(pq, (p− 1)(q − 1)) = 1.
2. Alice sets N = pq and λ = lcm(p− 1, q − 1).
3. Alice picks Γ ∈ Z∗N2 uniformly at random. In this context Z∗N2
indicates the ring of unities of ZN2 .
4. Alice checks that N divides the order of Γ. To do so it is sufficient
(see [39], Section 3) to compute µ = (L(gλ mod N2))−1 mod N ,
where L(x) is the quotient of the Euclidean division x−1N , i.e. the
largest integer value k such that x− 1 ≥ kN .
5. The public encryption key is (Γ, N). The private encryption key
is (µ, λ).
• Message Encryption:
1. To send a message m ∈ ZN to Alice Bob picks r ∈ Z∗N .
2. Bob computes c = ΓmrN mod N2.
• Decryption
1. Alice computes m = L(cλ mod N2) · µ mod N .
Let E and D be the encryption and decryption functions respectively. Given
two plaintexts m1,m2 ∈ ZN , their associated ciphertexts c1, c2 ∈ Z∗N2 and
a ∈ ZN then we define +E and ×E as follows:
c1 +E c2 = c1c2 mod N
2,
a×E c1 = ca1 mod N2.
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Then the homomorphic properties of the Pallier cryptosystem are:
D(c1 +E c2) = m1 +m2 mod N,
D(a×E c1) = am1 mod N.
2.4 ECDSA
The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), presented in [25],
is a variant of the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) [29] which uses elliptic
curve cryptography.
Suppose Alice wants to send a signed message m to Bob. Initially, they
agree on a cryptographic hash function [43] H, an elliptic curve E, a base
point B for E, with n the order of B a prime. For any point P ∈ E we use
the notation Px to denote the value of the first coordinate of the point P.
The protocol works as follows:
1. Alice creates a key-pair consisting of a private integer d, selected uni-
formly at random in the interval [1, n−1] and the public point Q = dB.
2. Alice computes e = H(m) and picks k uniformly at random in the
interval [1, n− 1].
3. Alice computes the point R = k−1B.
4. Alice computes s = k(e+ rd) with r = Rx.
The signature is the pair (r, s).
To verify the signature Bob performs the following steps:
1. Bob checks that r, s ∈ [1, n− 1],
2. Bob computes e = H(m),
3. Bob computes u1 = es
−1 mod n and u2 = rs−1 mod n,
4. Bob computes the point U = u1B + u2Q,
5. checks that r ≡ Ux mod n.
2.5 A Share Conversion Protocol
Assume that we have two parties, Alice and Bob, holding two secrets, re-
spectively a, b ∈ Zq with q prime, such that ab = x mod q. We can imagine
a, b as private shards of a shared secret x. Alice and Bob would like to per-
form a multiplicative-to-additive conversion in order to compute α, β ∈ Zq
such that α + β = x mod q. In this section we will present a protocol
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for this based on Pallier Encryption Scheme (see Section 2.3). We assume
that Alice has a public key A = (N,Γ), and EA will indicate the Pallier
encryption with A. Moreover we need a value K > q.
1. Alice initiates the protocol:
• Alice computes cA = EA(a) and sends it to Bob.
• Alice proves in ZK that a < K via the first range proof explained
in Appendix A.3.
2. Bob generates his shard β:
• Bob computes cB = b×E cA +E EA(β′) = EA(ab+ β′) where β′
is chosen uniformly at random in ZN .
• Bob sends cB to Alice.
• Bob proves in ZK that b < K via the second range proof presented
in Appendix A.3.
• If B = gb is public Bob proves in ZK that he knows b, β′ such
that gb = B and cB = b×E cA +E EA(β′).
3. Alice decrypts cB to obtain α
′.
4. Alice obtains her shard α = α′ mod q, Bob obtains his shard β = −β′.
The protocol takes two different names depending on whether B = gb is
public or not. In the first case we refer to this protocol as MtAwc (Multi-
plicative to Additive with check), because Bob performs the extra check at
the end, in the second we refer to it simply as MtA.
For more details about the protocol and the security proof see [16].
2.6 Feldman-VSS
Feldman’s VSS scheme[14] is a verifiable secret sharing scheme built on top
of Shamir’s scheme[46]. A secret sharing scheme is verifiable if auxiliary
information is included, that allows players to verify the consistency of their
shares. We use a simplified version of Feldman’s protocol: if the verification
fails the protocol does not attempt to recover excluding malicious partici-
pants, instead it aborts altogether. In a sense we consider somewhat honest
participants, for this reason we do not need stronger schemes such as [19,
45].
The scheme works as follows:
1. A cyclic group G of prime order p is chosen, as well as a generator
g ∈ G. The group G must be chosen such that the discrete logarithm
is hard to compute.
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2. The dealer computes a random polynomial P of degree t with coeffi-
cients in Zp, such that P (0) = s where s is the secret to be shared.
3. Each of the n share holders receive a value P (1), ..., P (n) mod p. So
far, this is exactly Shamir’s scheme.
4. To make these shares verifiable, the dealer distributes commitments to
the coefficients of p. Let P (X) = s+
∑n
i=1 aiX
i, then the commitments
are c0 = g
s and ci = g
ai for i > 0.
5. Any party can verify its share in the following way: let α be the share
received by the i-th party, then it can check if α = P (i) checking if
the following equality holds:
gα =
t∏
j=0
c
(ij)
j = g
s
t∏
j=1
gaj(i
j) = gs+
∑t
j=1 aj(i
j) = gP (i).
In the proof we will need to simulate a (2, 2)-threshold instance of this
protocol without knowing the secret value s.
Let us use an additive group with generator B, and let Y = sB, the
simulation proceeds as follows:
• the dealer selects two random values a, b and forces P (1) = a, P (2) = b;
• then it computes:
c1 = (aB − Y), (1)
c2 =
1
2
(bB − Y); (2)
• the other players can successfully verify their shards, checking that
aB = Y + c1 = Y + aB − Y, (3)
bB = Y + 2c2 = Y + 2 · 1
2
(bB − Y). (4)
3 Protocol Description
In this section we describe the details of our protocol. After some common
parameters are established, one player chooses a long-term asymmetric key
and then can go offline, leaving the proper generation of the signing key to
the remaining two participants. For this reason the signature algorithm is
presented in two variants, one used jointly by the two players who performed
the Key Generation, and one used by the offline player and one of the others.
More specifically the protocol is comprised by four phases:
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1. Setup Phase (Section 3.1): played by all the parties, it is used to
decide common parameters. Note that in many contexts these pa-
rameters are mandated by the application, so the parties merely ac-
knowledge them, possibly checking they respect the required security
level.
2. Key Generation (Section 3.2): played by only two parties, from now
on P1 and P2. It is used to create a public key and the private shards
for each player.
3. Ordinary Signature (Section 3.4): played by P1 and P2. As the
name suggests this is the normal use-case of the protocol.
4. Recovery Signature (Section 3.5): played by P3 and one between P1
and P2. This models the unavailability of one player, with P3 stepping
up as a replacement.
From here on with the notation “Pi does something”, we mean that both P1
and P2 perform the prescribed task independently. Similarly, the notation
“Pi sends something to Pj” means that P1 sends to P2 and P2 sends to P1.
3.1 Setup Phase
This phase involves all the participants and is used to decide the parameters
of the algorithm.
The parameters involved are the following:
Player 1 and 2
Input: −
Private Output: −
Public Output: E,B, q,H
Player 3
Input: −
Private Output: sk3
Public Output: pk3
P3 chooses an asymmetric encryption algorithm and a key pair (pk3, sk3),
then it publishes pk3, keeping sk3 secret. pk3 is the key that P1 and P2 will
use to communicate with P3. The algorithm which generates the key pair
(sk3, pk3) and the encryption algorithm itself are unrelated to the signature
algorithm, but it is important that both of them are secure.
More formally we require that the encryption protocol has the property of
IND-CPA [2, 35] i.e.
Definition 3.1. Let Π = (Gen,Enc,Dec) be a public key encryption scheme.
Let us define the following experiment between an adversary A and a chal-
lenger Cb parameterized by a bit b:
1. The challenger runs Gen(1k) to get sk and pk, the secret and public
keys. Then it gives pk to A.
2. A outputs two messages (m0,m1) of the same length.
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3. The challenger computes Enc(pk,mb) and gives it to A.
4. A outputs a bit b′(if it aborts without giving any output, we just set
b′ = 0). The challenger returns b′ as the output of the game.
We say that Π is secure against a chosen plaintext attack if for any k and
any probabilistic polynomial time adversary A the function
Adv(A) = P[C1(A, k) = 1]− P[C0(A, k) = 1], (5)
i.e. Adv(A) = P[b′ = b]− P[b′ 6= b], is negligible.
Then P1 and P3 need to agree on a secure hash function H, an elliptic
curve E with group of points of prime order q, and a generator B ∈ E of
said group. The order identifies the ring Zq used for scalar values.
3.2 Key Generation
Player 1
Input: pk3
Private Output: p1, q1, ω1
Shared Secrets: rec3,1, rec2,3, d
Public Output: Γ1, N2,Γ2,Y
Player 2
Input: pk3
Private Output: p2, q2, ω2
Shared Secrets: rec3,1, rec2,3, d
Public Output: Γ2, N1,Γ1,Y
The protocol proceeds as follows:
1. Secret key generation and communication:
a. Pi generates a Paillier public key (Ni,Γi) and its corresponding
secret key (pi, qi).
b. Pi selects randomly ui, σ3,i ∈ Zq.
c. Pi computes [KGCi,KGDi] := Com(uiB).
d. Pi computes [KGCSi,KGDSi] := Com(σ3,iB).
e. Pi sends KGCi, KGCSi, and (Ni,Γi) to Pj .
f. Pi sends KGDi,KGDSi to Pj .
g. Pi computes ujB = Ver(KGCj ,KGDj) and σ3,jB = Ver(KGCSj ,KGDSj).
2. Feldman VSS protocol and generation of P3’s data:
a. Pi selects randomly mi ∈ Zq.
b. Pi sets fi(X) = ui+miX, and σi,1 = fi(2), σi,2 = fi(3), σi,3 = fi(1).
Then Pi computes and distributes the shards ci,j for the Feldman-
VSS, as described in Section 2.6.
c. Everyone checks the integrity and consistency of the shards ac-
cording to the VSS protocol.
d. Pi encrypts σi,3 and σ3,i with pk3 to obtain reci,3.
9
e. Pi sends σi,j ,miB, reci,3 to Pj .
3. Pi computes the private key xi = σ1,i + σ2,i + σ3,i.
4. Pi proves in ZK that it knows xi using Schnorr’s protocol of Ap-
pendix A.1.
5. Pi proves in ZK that it knows pi, qi such that Ni = piqi using the
integer factorization ZKP of Appendix A.2.
6. Public key generation and shares conversion:
a. the public key is Y = ∑3i=1 uiB, where u3B = 3(σ3,1B)−2(σ3,2B).
So u3 = 3σ3,1 − 2σ3,2. From now on we will set u =
∑3
i=1 ui.
Obviously uB = Y.
b. the private key of P1 is ω1 = 3x1, while the private key of P2 is
w2 = −2x2. We can observe that w1 + w2 = u.
c. P1 and P2 can compute the common secret d = (σ2,1σ2,3B)x that
will be used for key derivation.
Observation 1. We define u3 = 3σ3,1−2σ3,2 because we need to be consis-
tent with the Feldman-VSS protocol. Indeed, suppose that σ3,2 and σ3,1 are
valid shards of a Feldman-VSS protocol where the secret is u3. Since there
is an m3 such that σ3,2 = u3 +m3 · 3 and σ3,1 = u3 +m3 · 2, we have that:
3σ3,1 − 2σ3,2 = 3u3 + 6m3 − 2u3 − 6m3 = u3.
Note that u3B can be computed by both P1 and P2, but u3 cannot.
3.3 Signature Algorithm
This protocol is used by two players, called PA and PB, to sign messages.
P1, P2, and P3 take the role of either PA or PB depending on the situation,
see Sections 3.4 and 3.5.
The participants agree on a message M to sign. The goal of this protocol
is to produce a valid ECDSA signature (r, s) for the public key y.
The parameters involved are:
Player A
Input: M,ωA,ΓA, pA,
qA, NB,ΓB,Y
Public Output: (r, s)
Player B
Input: M,ωB,ΓB, pB,
qB, NA,ΓA,Y
Public Output: (r, s)
The protocol works as follows:
1. Commitment phase:
a. Pi picks randomly ki, γi ∈ Zq.
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b. Pi computes Gi = γiB and [∆i, Di] = Com(Gi).
We define γ = γA + γB and k = kA + kB.
c. Pi sends ∆i to Pj .
2. Multiplicative to additive conversion:
a. Pi re-computes the parameters for Paillier encryption from its
keys: λi = lcm(pi−1, qi−1), µi = (Li(Γλii mod N2i ))−1 mod Ni
where Li(x) =
x−1
Ni
.
b. PA and PB run MtA(kA, γB) to get respectively αA,B, βA,B such
that kAγB = αA,B + βA,B. They also run it on kB, γA to get
respectively βB,A and αB,A.
c. Pi sets δi = kiγi + αi,j + βj,i.
d. PA and PB run MtAwc(kA, ωB) to get respectively µA,B νA,B
such that kAωB = µA,B +νA,B. They also run it on kB, ωA to get
respectively νB,A and µB,A.
e. Pi sets σi = kiωi + µij + νji. We can observe that
∑
σi = ku.
f. Pi sends δi to Pj .
g. PA and PB compute δ = δA + δB and δ
−1 mod q.
3. Decommitment phase and ZKP:
a. Pi sends Di.
b. Pi computes Gj = Ver(∆j , Dj).
c. Pi proves in ZK that it knows γi such that γiB = Gi, using
Schnorr’s protocol.
d. PA and PA set R = δ−1(GA + GB) and r = Rx. We can observe
that δ = γk and GA + GB = γB, so R = k−1B.
4. Signature generation:
a. Both players set m = H(M).
b. Pi computes si = mki + rσi.
c. Pi picks uniformly at random li, ρi ∈ Zq, and computes Wi :=
siR+ liB, Zi = ρiB, and then [∆ˆi, Dˆi] = Com(Wi,Zi).
d. Pi sends ∆ˆi to Pj .
e. Pi sends Dˆi to Pj .
f. Pi computes [Wj ,Zj ] := Ver(∆ˆj , Dˆj).
g. Each Pi proves in ZK that it knows si, li, ρi such that Wi =
siR+ liB and Zi = ρiB (if a ZKP fails, the protocol aborts).
h. PA and PA compute W := −mB − ry +WA +WB and Z :=
ZA + ZB.
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i. Each Pi computes Ui := ρiW, Ti := liZ and [∆˜i, D˜i] := Com(Ui, Ti).
j. Pi sends ∆˜i to Pj .
k. Pi sends D˜i to Pj .
l. Pi computes [Uj , Tj ] := Ver(∆˜j , D˜j).
m. If T1 + T2 6= U1 + U2 the protocol aborts.
n. Pi sends si.
o. P1 and P2 compute s := s1 + s2.
p. If (r, s) is not a valid signature, the players abort, otherwise they
accept and end the protocol.
3.4 Ordinary Signature
This is the case where P1 and P2 wants to sign a message m. They run the
signature algorithm of Section 3.3 with the following parameters (supposing
P1 play the roles of PA and P2 of PB):
Player A
Input: M,ω1,Γ1, p1,
q1, N2,Γ2,Y
Public Output: (r, s)
Player B
Input: M,ω2,Γ2, p2,
q2, N1,Γ1,Y
Public Output: (r, s)
3.5 Recovery Signature
If one between P1 and P2 is unable to sign, then P3 has to come back online
and a recovery signature is performed.
We have to consider two different cases, depending on who is offline.
First we consider the case in which P2 is offline, therefore P1 and P3 sign.
The parameters involved are:
Player 1
Input: M,ω1,Γ1, p1, q1,Y
rec2,3, rec1,3
Public Output: (r, s)
Player 3
Input: M, sk3
Public Output: (r, s)
The workflow in this case is:
1. Communication:
a.) P1 contacts P3, which comes back online.
b.) P1 sends y and rec1,3, rec2,3 to P3.
2. Paillier keys generation and exchange:
a.) P3 generates a Paillier public key (N3,Γ3) and its relative secret
key (p3, q3).
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b.) Pi sends Ni,Γi to the other party.
c.) Pi proves to Pj that it knows pi, qi such that Ni = piqi using
integer factorization ZKP.
3. P3’s secrets generation:
a.) P3 decrypts rec1,3 and rec2,3 with its private key sk3, getting
σ1,3, σ3,1, σ2,3, σ3,2.
b.) P3 computes x3 = σ1,3 + 2σ3,1 − σ3,2 + σ2,3.
c.) Pi proves in ZK that it knows xi using Schnorr’s protocol.
4. Signature generation:
a.) P1 computes ω˜1 := −13ω1.
b.) P3 computes ω3 := 2x3.
c.) P1 and P3 perform the Signature Algorithm of Section 3.3 as PA
and PB respectively, where the P1 uses ω˜1 in place of ωA and P3
uses ω3 in place of ωB (the other parameters are straightforward).
We consider now the second case in which P1 is offline, therefore P2 and P3
sign.
The parameters involved are:
Player 2
Input: M,ω2,Γ2, p2, q2,Y
rec2,3, rec1,3
Public Output: (r, s)
Player 3
Input: M, sk3
Public Output: (r, s)
The workflow of this case is:
1. Communication:
a.) P2 contacts P3, which comes back online.
b.) P2 sends y and rec1,3, rec2,3 to P3.
2. Paillier keys generation and exchange:
a.) P3 generates a Paillier public key (N3,Γ3) and its relative secret
key (p3, q3).
b.) Pi sends Ni,Γi to the other party.
c.) Pi proves to Pj that it knows pi, qi such that Ni = piqi using
integer factorization ZKP.
3. P3’s secrets generation:
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a.) P3 decrypts rec1,3 and rec2,3 with its private key sk3, getting σ1,3,
σ3,1, σ2,3, σ3,2.
b.) P3 computes x3 = σ1,3 + 2σ3,1 − σ3,2 + σ2,3.
c.) Pi proves in ZK that it knows xi using Schnorr’s protocol.
4. Signature generation:
a.) P2 computes ω˜2 :=
1
4ω2.
b.) P3 computes ω3 :=
3
2x3.
c.) P2 and P3 perform the Signature Algorithm of Section 3.3 as PA
and PB respectively, where the P2 uses ω˜2 in place of ωA and P3
uses ω3 in place of ωB (the other parameters are straightforward).
Observation 2. We define ω˜i in this way since we need ω˜i + ω3 = u, with
i ∈ {1, 2}. Moreover we define x3 in this way for the same reasons explained
in Observation 1.
3.6 Key Derivation
In many applications it is useful to deterministically derive multiple signing
keys from a single master key (see e.g. BIP32 for Bitcoin wallets [50]),
and this practice becomes even more useful since in our protocol the key
generation is a multi-party computation.
In order to perform the key derivation we need a derivation index i and
the common secret d created during the Key Generation protocol.
The derivation is performed as follows:
• P1 and P2 perform the key derivation:
– ω1 → ωi1 = ω1 + 3H(d||i),
– ω2 → ωi2 = ω2 − 2H(d||i),
– Y → Y i = y +H(d||i)B.
• P1 and P3 perform the key derivation:
– ω1 → ωi1 = ω1 −H(d||i),
– ω3 → ωi3 = ω3 + 2H(d||i),
– Y → Y i = y +H(d||i)B.
• P2 and P3 perform the key derivation:
– ω2 → ωi2 = ω2 − 12H(d||i),
– ω3 → ωi3 = ω3 + 32H(d||i),
– Y → Y i = y +H(d||i)B.
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Observation 3. We observe that the algorithm outputs valid keys, such
that, for example:
(ωi1 + ω
i
2)B = yi.
Since (ωi1 + ω
i
2) = ω1 + ω2 +H(d||i) we have that:
(ωi1 + ω
i
2)B = (ω1 + ω2 +H(d||i))B = Y +H(d||i)B = Y i.
With the same procedure we can prove that also the other pairs of derived
keys are consistent.
4 Security Proof
As customary for digital signature protocols, we state the security of our
scheme as an unforgeability property, defined as follows (adapted from the
classical definition introduced in [21]):
Definition 4.1. We say that a (t, n)-threshold signature scheme is unforge-
able if no malicious adversary who corrupts at most t players can produce
with non-negligible probability the signature on a new message m, given the
view of Threshold-Sign on input messages m1, ...,mk (which the adversary
adaptively chooses), as well as the signatures on those messages.
Referring to this definition the security of our protocol derives from the
following theorem, whose proof is the topic of this section:
Theorem 4.1. Assuming that
• the ECDSA signature scheme is unforgeable,
• the strong RSA assumption holds,
• (Com,Ver) is a non malleable commitment scheme,
• the DDH assumption holds,
• and that encryption algorithm used by P3 is IND-CPA 1,
the threshold ECDSA protocol is unforgeable.
The proof will use a classical game-based argument, our goal is to show
that if there is an adversary A that forges the threshold scheme with a
non-negligible probability ε > λ−c, for a polynomial λ(x) and c > 0, we
can build a forger F that forges the centralised ECDSA scheme with non-
negligible probability as well.
1In this proof we focus on the unforgeability property. We discuss other security
aspects, such as recovery resiliency, in Section 5.
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Since the algorithm presented is a (2, 3)-threshold signature scheme the
adversary will control one player and F will simulate the remaining two.
Since the role of P3 is different we have to consider two distinct cases: one
for A controlling P3 and one for A controlling one between P1 and P2 (whose
roles are symmetrical). The second case is way more interesting and difficult,
so it will be discussed first, and for now we suppose without loss of generality
that A controls P2.
Definition 4.2 (Security Game:). The security game between a challenger
C and an adversary A is defined as follows:
• C runs the preliminary phase and sets up the parameters, C controls
both P1 and P3.
• C and A participate in the key generation algorithm.
• A chooses adaptively some messages m1, ...,ml for some l > 0 and asks
for a signature on them. A could either participate in the signature or
it can query to C a signature generated by P1 and P3.
• Eventually A outputs a new message m 6= mi∀i and a valid signature
for it with probability at least ε.
If we denote with τA the adversary’s tape and with τi the tape of the
honest player Pi we can write:
Pτi,τA [A(τA)Pi(τi) = forgery] ≥ ε, (6)
where Pτi,τA means that the probability is taken over the random tape τA of
the adversary and the random tape τi of the honest player, while A(τA)Pi(τi)
is the output of the iteration between the adversary A, running on tape τA,
and the player Pi, running on tape τi . We say that an adversary’s random
tape τA is good if:
Pτi [A(τA)Pi(τi) = forgery] ≥
ε
2
. (7)
Now we have the following Lemma, introduced in [16]:
Lemma 4.1. if τA is chosen uniformly at random the probability of choosing
a good one is at least ε2 .
Proof. In the proof we will simplify the notation writingA(τA, τi) = forgery
instead of A(τA)Pi(τi) = forgery. Moreover we write b to identify a good
tape, while c will be a bad one. We can rewrite Equation 6 in this way:
A = Pτi,τA(τA = b, A(τA, τi) = forgery) + Pτi,τA(τA = c, A(τA, τi) = forgery)
= PτA,τi(τA = b)Pτi,τA(A(τA, τi) = forgery|τA = b)
+ PτA,τi(τA = c)Pτi,τA(A(τA, τi) = forgery|τA = c). (8)
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Trivially we have that Pτi,τA(A(τA, τi) = forgery|τA = b) < 1, and from the
definition of good tape in Equation 7 we get:
Pτi,τA(A(τA, τi) = forgery|τA = c) <
ε
2
. (9)
Now we want to solve for x = PτA,τi(τA = b), so we get:
ε ≤ A < x · 1 + (1− x) · ε
2
= x
(
1− ε
2
)
+
ε
2
, (10)
that leads us to the conclusion:
x ≥ ε−
ε
2
1− ε2
≥ ε
2− ε ≥
ε
2
. (11)
From now on we will suppose that the adversary is running on a good
random tape.
Now we describe the simulation for the key generation protocol. The
forger F receives from its challenger the public key Yc = xB for the cen-
tralised ECDSA, a public key E1 for Paillier and a public key pk3 for the
asymmetric encryption scheme.
The simulation proceeds rewinding A and repeating the following steps
until the public key has been correctly generated (i.e. Y 6=⊥), which happens
if A sends a correct decommitment on behalf of P2 also after the rewind of
step 5:
1. A computes and broadcasts KGC2 and KGCS2.
2. F selects random values u1, σ3,1, computes [KGC1,KGD1] = Com(u1B),
[KGCS1,KGCS1] = Com(σ3,1B)and sends KGC1,KGCS1.
3. Each player Pi broadcasts its decommitments and the Feldman-VSS
values. Let uiB, σ3,iB be the values decommitted.
4. Each player sends their Paillier public key Ei.
5. at this point F computes uˆB = Yc−u2B−3σ3,1B+2σ3,2B and rewinds
A to its commitment of KGC1 (step 2). We remark that F does not
know uˆ but only uˆB.
6. F sends ˆKGC1, the commitment corresponding to uˆB. The commit-
ment for σ3,1B remains the same.
7. if A refuses to decommit then uiB is set to ⊥.
8. F simulates a fake (since F is not able to compute the random poly-
nomial f(x)) as said in Section 2.6.
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9. F participates in the ZK, extracting the secret values from A.
10. the remaining steps remain the same. If ui =⊥ for some i the public
key y is set to ⊥. It is important to note that P1 does not know the
value of σ1,3 and therefore uses a random value to compute rec1,3.
Now we prove that the simulation terminates in expected polynomial
time, that it is indistinguishable from the real protocol and that it terminates
with output Yc except with negligible probability.
Lemma 4.2. The simulation terminates in expected polynomial time and it
is indistinguishable from the real protocol.
Proof. Since A is running on a good random tape we know that it will
correctly decommit with probability at least ε2 , then we need to rewind only
a polynomial number of times, since the expected number of iterations we
need to perform is 2ε < 2λ
c. The first difference between the real protocol
and the simulated one is that F does not know the discrete logarithm of uˆB
and so it needs to perform a “fake” Feldman-VSS. This is indistinguishable
from a real Feldman-VSS since they have both the same distribution, as
shown in Section 2.6. The other difference is that F does not know the
value of σ1,3 and therefore uses a random value to compute rec1,3, but since
the encryption algorithm is IND-CPA for the adversary this ciphertext is
indistinguishable from the real one.
Lemma 4.3. For a polynomially large fraction of possible values for the
input Yc the simulation terminates with output Yc except with negligible
probability.
Proof. First we prove that if the simulation terminates correctly (i.e. with
output which is not ⊥) then it terminates with Yc except with negligible
probability.
This is a consequence of the non-malleability property of the commit-
ment scheme. Indeed, if A correctly decommits KGC2 twice it must do so
to the same string, no matter what P1 decommits to (except with negligible
probability). Therefore, due to our choice for uˆB we have that the output
is exactly Yc.
Now we prove that the simulation ends correctly for a polynomially large
fractions of the inputs.
Since A is running on a good random tape it decommits correctly for
at least a fraction ε2 >
1
2λc of the possible values of uˆB. Moreover, since
Yc and σ3,1 are chosen uniformly at random, and y2 and σ3,2 are chosen
by A without the knowledge of the other values, we can conclude that
uˆB = Yc − u2B − 3σ3,1 + 2σ3,2 (that is fully determined before the rewind)
has also uniform distribution. Then given the 1-to-1 correspondence be-
tween Yc and uˆB we can conclude that for a fraction ε2 > 12λc of the inputs
the protocol will correctly terminate.
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Observation 4. In the simulation it is crucial that the adversary broadcasts
KGC2 and KGCS2 before F. Inverting the order will cause this simulation
to fail, since after the rewind A could change its commitment. Due to the
non-malleability property we are assured that A can not deduce anything
about the content of these commitments, but nevertheless it could use it as
a seed for the random generation of its values. In this case F guesses the
right uˆB only with probability 1q where q is the size of the group, so the
expected time is exponential.
It is possible to swap the order in the first step using an equivocable
commitment scheme with a secret trapdoor. In this case we only need to
rewind at the decommitment step, we change KCD1 in order to match uˆB.
In this way we could prove the security of the protocol also in the presence
of a rushing adversary but we need an additional hypothesis regarding the
commitment scheme.
Now we describe the simulation of the protocol for the signature gen-
eration. In the same way Gennaro and Goldfeder did in [16], we need to
distinguish two different types of executions depending on what happens
during the step 3 in the signature generation algorithm:
1. Semi-correct executions: the adversary has followed the protocol and
committed-decommitted the correct k2, then the equality R = k−1B
holds, where k = k1 + k2. In this case F is able to correctly determine
the value s1R and therefore to correctly terminate the simulation.
2. Non-semi-correct executions: the value decommitted by A is not the
correct k2, then the value k
−1 is not the proper one. We will show that
a simulation that is not semi-correct will fail with high probability since
the value U1 contributed by P1 is indistinguishable from a random one.
This allows us to simulate the protocol by simply using a random s˜1
for P1 instead of the correct one.
We note that it is impossible to distinguish the two cases a priori, so
the idea is to guess if an execution will be semi-correct or not. In the semi-
correct executions the simulator will be able to extract the “signature shard”
of P1 and to terminate the simulation successfully, in the non-semi-correct
ones our simulator will guess a random signature causing the protocol to
abort (we will show that in the non-semi-correct execution the real protocol
aborts with high probability).
We now present the simulation for a semi-correct execution. We recall
that F does not know the secret values of P1 (ω1 and the secret key corre-
sponding to its Paillier public key) but it knows the secret values of P2. In
the following simulation F aborts whenever the original protocol is supposed
to abort.
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1. Both players pick randomly ki, γi and broadcast ∆i.
2. Both players execute the MtA protocol for kγ. Since P1 can not decrypt
α1,2, F sets it at random.
3. Both players execute the MtAwc protocol for kω. From the ZKP F
extracts ν1,2. Since F does not know ω1 it sends a random µ2,1 to P2.
At this point F knows σ2.
4. Both players execute the protocol, revealing δi and setting δ = δ1 + δ2.
5. Both players send Di.
6. F queries its signature oracle and receives a signature (r, s) for m. It
computes R = ms−1B+ rs−1Y. We note that, in centralised ECDSA,
we have sR = k(m + ru)R = mB + ruB = mB + rY. Then the R
we compute in our simulation is the correct value in the centralised
algorithm.
7. F rewinds A and changes its commitment to Gˆ1 = δ−1R − G2. In
this way we have that δ(Gˆ1 + G2) = R. In the steps after the new
commitment P1 uses the old values of γ1 and k1 since it does not know
the correct ones.
8. At this point F knows the value s2 and then it can compute the right
s1 as s1 = s− s2.
9. P1 and P2 follow the remaining part of the protocol normally.
Observation 5. As in the case of the Enrollment Phase we need that A
speaks first, in order to rewind to our commitment phase without chang-
ing A’s random tape. The same argument about equivocable commitment
schemes and rushing adversaries applies here as well.
Lemma 4.4. Assuming that
• The Strong RSA Assumption holds,
• we use a non malleable commitment scheme,
then the simulation has the following properties:
• on input m it outputs a valid signature (r, s) or aborts,
• it is computationally indistinguishable from a semi-correct real execu-
tion.
Proof. The differences between the real and the simulated views are the
following:
20
• P1 does not know the discrete logarithm of G1. Moreover G1 6= γ1B.
• in the real protocol R = (k1 + k2)−1B, in this simulation R is chosen
by the signing oracle.
We have that c1 = E(γ1) is sent during the MtA protocol. In order to
distinguish between a real execution and a simulated one an adversary should
detect if c1 is the encryption of a random plaintext or if it is the encryption
of logB(G1). The strong RSA assumption assures the semantic security of
Paillier’s encryption, so this is infeasible.
In the same way let e1 = E(k1). We can write R = (kˆ1 + k2)−1B, where
we could imagine kˆ1 sent by a random oracle (in reality we never calculate
kˆ1 in the simulation because we compute directly R). Then (kˆ1 +k2)R = B,
so kˆ1R = B − k2R and kˆ1 = logR(B − k2R). With the same argument as
before we can conclude that the simulation is indistinguishable from the real
execution. It is worth noting that we are simulating a semi-correct execution
with a non-semi-correct one, but since they are indistinguishable this is fine.
Now let (r, s) be the signature that F receives by its oracle in the sixth
point of the protocol. Note that the change of the commitment after the
rewind does not change the view for A given the hiding and non-malleabilty
properties of the commitment scheme and the considerations above, so as
a consequence of the non-malleability property of the commitment scheme
the decommitment is consistent and we have that if the protocol terminates
it does so with output (r, s).
Now we show how to simulate the protocol for a non semi-correct exe-
cution, i.e. when the value decommitted by A is not the real k2.
1. the simulator runs the semi-correct simulation from the first to the
sixth point.
2. F does not rewind A to fix the value of R. Instead it runs the protocol
normally.
3. F chooses s˜1 ∈ Zq and U1 at random and uses these values in the last
part of the protocol.
The only difference between the semi-correct simulation and this one is the
choice of s1 and U1. The reason is that in the semi-correct simulation F can
arbitrarily fix R because the values decommitted by A are the real ones,
instead in the non-semi-correct simulation this is impossible since the value
k1 does not match anymore. Therefore F tries to make the protocol fail
choosing U1 and s1 at random.
We divide the proof in two different steps: first we prove that a real
non-semi-correct execution is indistinguishable from a simulation in which
P1 uses the right s1 but outputs a random U1 and then we prove that this
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second intermediate simulation is indistinguishable from the one described
above, with both s1 and U1 chosen randomly.
Lemma 4.5. Assuming that
• the DDH Assumption holds,
• Com,Ver is a non malleable commitment scheme,
then the simulation is computationally indistinguishable from a non-semi-
correct real execution.
Proof. As anticipated we construct three games between F and A. In the
first one, G0, the simulator will simply run the real protocol. In the game
G1, F follows the real protocol but chooses U1 randomly. Finally, in G2,
F runs the simulation previously described, with both s1 and U1 chosen at
random. Now we proceed to prove the indistinguishability of G0 and G1
and then of G1 and G2.
Let us assume that there is an adversary A0 that can distinguish between
G0 and G1. We show that this contradicts the DDH Assumption.
Let A˜ = aB, B˜ = bB, C˜ = cB be the DDH challenge where c = ab or c is
random in Zq. The distinguisher F0 runs A0, simulating the key generation
phase so that Y = bB. It can do that by rewinding the adversary and
changing its decommitment to u1B = Y − u2B − σ3,1B + 2σ3,2B, making
Y = B˜. Thanks to the ZKP F0 extracts the values of x2 (and then of
ω2) from the adversary, but does not know b (and therefore not x1 nor
ω1 = b − ω2). In this simulation we can also suppose that F0 knows the
secret key associated to E1, its public key of the Paillier cryptosystem (we
can do this since we are not making any reduction to the security of the
encryption scheme).
At this point F0 runs the signature generation protocol for a non-semi-
correct execution. It runs the protocol normally till the MtA and MtAwc
part of the signature protocol. It knows γ1, k1, since it runs P1 normally,
and γ2, since it extracts its value from the adversary. Therefore F0 knows
k such that R = k−1B. Since we suppose that F0 knows the secret key
associated to E1 it can also know µ1,2 obtained from the MtAwc protocol
on input ω2 and k1. Since it does not know ω1, during the MtAwc protocol
on input ω1 and k2 it sends a random µ2,1 and sets:
ν2,1 = k2ω1 − µ2,1. (12)
So at the end of the MtAwc we have that:
σ1 = k1ω1 + µ1,2 + ν2,1; (13)
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using eq. (12) in eq. (13) we get
σ1 = k1ω1 + k2ω1 − µ2,1 + µ1,2 = k˜ω1 + µ1,2 − µ2,1,
where k˜ = k1 +k2 and we have that k˜ 6= k since we are in a non-semi-correct
execution. Remembering that ω1 = b−ω2 we can substitute again, obtaining
σ1 = k˜b− k˜ω2 + µ1,2 − µ2,1, (14)
and F0 knows every value in the equation except b, so let us group these
known values and set µ1 = k˜ω2 + µ1,2 − µ2,1. Thus F0 can successfully
compute:
σ1B = k˜bB + µ1B = k˜B˜ + µ1B, (15)
and therefore also:
s1R = (k1m+ rσ1)k−1B = (k1m+ rµ1)k−1B + k˜rk−1B˜. (16)
We now proceed to the last part of the simulation. F0 selects a random
l1 and sets W1 = s1R1 + l1B. Instead of following the algorithm F0 does
not choose a random ρ1 but sets implicitly ρ1 = a and sends A1 = aB = A˜.
During the ZKP that it simulates (since it does not know a nor s1) it extracts
s2, l2, ρ2 from the adversary. Let us define s = k
−1s2. We note that:
W = −mB − rY +W1 +W2 (17)
= (l1 + l2)B + s1R+ (s−m)B − rY (18)
= lB + t1B + t2B˜, (19)
where t1 = k
−1(k1m + rµ1) + s −m and t2 = k−1k˜r − r. We note that in
a not-semi-correct execution k˜ 6= k and then t2 6= 0. Finally F0 computes
T1 = l1A correctly but for U1 it outputs U1 = (l + t1)A˜+ t2C˜ and aborts.
More explicitly we have that:
U1 = (l + t1)A˜+ t2C˜ (20)
= (l + k−1(k1m+ rµ1) + s−m)A˜+ (k−1k˜r − r)C˜ (21)
=
(
l1 + l2 + k
−1(k1m+ rµ1) + s−m
)
aB + (k−1k˜r − r)cB (22)
If we have c = ab this equation can be further simplified to:
U1 = a(l1 + l2)B + ak−1(k1m+ rµ1 + k˜rb) + a(s−m)B − abrB (23)
= a(l1 + l2)B + ak−1s1B + ak−1s2B − amB − abrB (24)
= a(l1 + l2)B + ak−1(s1 + s2)B − a(br +m)B, (25)
and we note also that:
aW = aW1 + aW2 − amB − arY (26)
= as1R+ al1B + as2R+ al2B − amB − arbB (27)
= a(l1 + l2)B + ak−1(s1 + s2)B − a(br +m)B. (28)
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Then we can conclude that if c = ab we have U1 = aV = ρ1W, as in G0,
otherwise U1 is a random group element as in G1. Then if a distinguisher for
G0 and G1 exists it can be also used to win a DDH challenge as we described
above, so G0 and G1 are indistinguishable.
Now we deal with the indistinguishability of G1 and G2. We recall
that the difference between the protocols G1 and G2 is that in G2 we use a
random s˜1 during the last part and then we have a random W˜1 = s˜1R+ l1B.
Once again we will prove that G1 is indistiguishable from G2 performing a
reduction to the DDH assumption. The idea is to show thatW1 = s1R+l1B
and W˜1 = s˜1R+l1B are indistinguishable due to the random value l1B added
to both of them.
Let A˜ = (a−d)B, B˜ = bB, C˜ = abB be the DDH challenge where d = 0 or
d is a random value of Zq. The simulator proceeds with the regular protocol
until step 4c. Then F0 broadcasts W1 = s1R+ A˜ and A1 = B˜. It simulates
the ZKP (since it does not know l1 and ρ1) and extracts s2, l2, ρ2. Then it
computes U1 as a random element and T1 = C˜ + ρ2A˜ = abB + ρ2(a− d)B.
When d = 0 we have A˜ = aB, so a = l1 , b = ρ1 and we have that
W1 = s1R+ l1B and:
T1 = abB + ρ2aB = l1ρ1B + l1ρ2B = l1(ρ1 + ρ2)B, (29)
so T1 = l1A as in G1. Otherwise, when d 6= 0 we have that A˜ = aB − dB
with a randomly distributed d, then this is equivalent to have:
W1 = s1R+ (a− d)B = s˜1R+ aB, (30)
with s˜1 = s1−dk−1, that is uniformly distributed thanks to d, and T1 = l1A
as in G2. The key idea is that we use the random value d to change the
fixed value s1 to a random and unknown s˜1 during the computation of W1.
Therefore, under the DDH assumption, G1 and G2 are indistinguishable.
Then G0 is indistinguishable from G2 as we wanted to prove.
Now we have to deal with the recovery signature algorithm. Since the
core algorithm remains the same we can use the two proofs already ex-
plained, we only need to change the setup phase in which the third player
recovers its secret material. In this section we still examine the case in which
A controls one between P1 or P2 and F controls P3. Things are a little bit
different if A controls P3 since it does not perform the enrollment phase
(this case is much easier).
Trivially if A asks for a recovery signature between the two honest parties F
can simply query its oracle and output whatever the oracle outputs. So we
can limit ourselves to deal with the case where the adversary participates in
the signing process.
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Without loss of generality we suppose that A controls P2. The simulation
works as follows:
1. P2 sends Y, rec1,2, rec1,3 to P3.
2. Pi generates a Paillier public key (Ni,Γi) and sends it to the other
party.
3. Pi proves in ZK that it knows the matching secret for its public Paillier
key.
4. P3 can not decrypt the values received in step 1, so it simulates the
ZKP about x3 and at the same time it can extract the secret value
x2 from P2. Note that the inability to decrypt is not a problem since
most of the data is useless (the random values sent by F during the
enrolment phase), so it would not have been able to compute x3 nor
ω3 anyway. However the simulator remembers the correct values of
rec1,2, rec1,3, so if A does not send the proper ones it can abort the
simulation, as it would happen in a real execution since P3 can not
recover a secret key shard that matches Y.
5. P2 computes its x˜2 and ω˜2 from its original shards.
6. P2 and P3 perform the signing algorithm with the above simulation.
Also in this case F does not know its secret key, but we remark that
this is fine since it can use the signing oracle.
In the case of P3 being dishonest the simulation is much more easier. During
the enrolment phase F can produce random shards to send to P3 during the
recovery signature phase and output directly its original ECDSA challenge.
Then with the same algorithm as before it can perform the signing protocol.
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 4.1.
Proof. Let Q < λc be the maximum number of signature queries that the
adversary makes. In the real protocol the adversary will output a forgery
after l < Q queries, either because it stops submitting queries or because
the protocol aborts. In our simulation we try to guess if a simulation will
be semi-correct or not choosing a random i ∈ [0, Q]. We have two cases:
• if i = 0 we assume that all the executions are semi-correct and then
we always use the semi-correct algorithm described previously.
• if i 6= 0 we assume that the first i − 1 are semi-correct, but the ith is
not. In this case we use the semi-correct algorithm for every execution
except for the ith one, for which we use the non-semi-correct one, then
we abort.
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As we previously proved we produce an indistinguishable view for the ad-
versary, then A will produce a forgery with the same probability as in a real
execution. Then the probability of success of our forger F is ε
3
8Q and it is
the product of:
• the probability of choosing a good random tape for A, that is at least
ε
2 , a shown in Lemma 4.1,
• the probability of hitting a good public key, that also is at least ε2 , as
shown in Lemma 4.2 and Lemma 4.3,
• the probability of guessing the right index i, that is 1Q ,
• the probability ofA to successfully produce a forgery on a good random
tape, that is ε2 as shown in Equation 7.
Under the security of the ECDSA signature scheme the probability of pro-
ducing a forgery must be negligible, which implies that ε must negligible
too, contradicting the hypothesis that A has non-negligible probability of
forging the scheme.
5 Conclusions
Although decentralized signature algorithms have been known for a while,
we are aware of only few proposals for algorithms that are able to produce
signatures indistinguishable from a standard one. Moreover, the protocol
described in this work is, as far as we know, the first example of threshold
multi-signature allowing the presence of an off-line participant. Regard-
ing the protocol’s specification, the main difference w.r.t. [16] lies in the
key generation phase. Specifically, the idea is to have two active partici-
pants to simulate the action of the third one. This step is possible due to
the uniqueness property of polynomial interpolation that gives a bijection
between points and coefficients, that combined to the preserved uniform
distribution in Zp allows us to “invert” the generation of the shares, that
are later recovered by the offline party thanks to an asymmetric encryption
scheme. A second divergence is that we have managed to avoid the use of
equivocable commitments under the assumption that in some specific steps
(see Observation 4) we can consider the adversary to not be rushing.
The main efficiency bottleneck is in the massive usage of ZKPs, which
are necessary to guarantee the security of the signature itself against black-
box adversaries, as hinted by the security proof of Section 4. Nevertheless,
there are implementations that use our protocol to resiliently manage bitcoin
wallets [10].
In our security analysis we focused on the unforgeability of the signa-
ture, however with an offline party (and more so in the application context of
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crypto-assets management) there is another security aspect worth of consid-
eration: the resiliency of recovery in the presence of a malicious adversary.
Of course if the offline party is malicious and unwilling to cooperate in fund
recovery there is nothing we can do about it, however the security can be
strengthened if we consider that one of the online parties may corrupt the
recovery material. In this case a generic CPA asymmetric encryption scheme
is not sufficient to prevent malicious behaviour, because we need a verifi-
able scheme that allows the parties to prove that the recovery material is
consistent, just like they prove that they computed the shards correctly. In
this way the adversary is unable to corrupt the recovery material and then
there is always a couple of players able to sign. An interesting topic of fur-
ther analysis surely regards such encryption schemes, for example we see
potential solution that could exploit the homomorphic properties of Paillier
or ElGamal [13] cryptosystems.
Other future research steps involve the generalisation to (t, n)-threshold
schemes with more than one offline party, as well as to different standard
signatures. Regarding the latter, there is a variant of our protocol whose
signatures are indistinguishable from EdDSA [32], and we are working on
its security proof.
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A Zero Knowledge Proofs
A.1 Schnorr Protocol
The Schnorr Protocol is a zero-knowledge proof for the discrete logarithm.
Let G be a group of prime order p with generator g. Let h ∈ G be a random
element in G. The prover P wants to prove to a verifier V that it knows the
discrete logarithm of h, i.e. it knows x ∈ Zp such that gx = h.
So the common inputs are G, g and h, while the secret input of P is x.
The protocol works as follows:
1. P picks r uniformly at random in Zp and computes u = gr. It sends u
to V.
2. V picks c uniformly at random ∈ Zp and sends it to P.
3. P computes z = r + cx and sends z to V.
4. V computes gz. If P really knows x it holds that gz = uhc. If the
equality does not hold, the verifier rejects.
A detailed proof about the security of the algorithm can be found in [44].
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A.1.1 Schnoor Protocol Simulation
We need to simulate the Schnorr protocol in two different ways: first we need
to use it to extract the adversary’s secret value, then we need to simulate
it without knowing our secret value, tricking the opponent. We can use the
Schnorr protocol to extract the value x from the adversary in this way:
1. Follow the standard protocol until the third point, obtaining z.
2. Rewind the adversary to the second point and pick c′ 6= c.
3. Follow the remaining part of the protocol, obtaining z′.
4. We can compute z−z
′
c−c′ =
(c−c′)x
c−c′ = x.
Sketch. Since the only extra hypothesis for c′ is that c′ 6= c we can suppose
that c′ has uniform distribution as well. Moreover z, once the verifier sent
c the value of z is fixed, so the rewinding technique does not cause any
problem.
At the same time we need to be able to simulate the protocol without
knowing x. The simulation works as follows:
1. Follow the protocol until the second point, obtaining c.
2. Rewind the adversary to the first point. The simulator picks r ran-
domly and computes u′ = g−xc+r = (gx)−cgr. Under the discrete
logarithm assumption and since r, c are random element, this is indis-
tinguishable from gr.
3. The simulator sends u′ and the adversary sends c again.
4. The simulator sends z = r − cx+ cx = r.
5. The adversary checks that gz = gr = u′(gx)c = g−xcgrgxc.
Sketch. The tricky point of the simulation is the third point, when we need
that the adversary sends the same c it has previously sent, since sending a
different r could change the random choice of c . This could be achieved
introducing an equivocable commitment scheme, in this way we need only to
change the decommitment value after receiving the adversary commitment.
A.2 Integer Factorization Proof
We now present a well-known ZK proof for the integer factorization problem.
Let k be the security parameter and N = pq with neither p nor q small.
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Let A,B, l be such that 2 l logB = θ(k), (N − φ(N))lB < A < N . Let
z1, . . . , zk ∈ Z∗N be chosen uniformly at random. The protocol consists in
the repetition l times of the following sub-protocol:
1. The prover P picks r ∈ {0, ..., A− 1} at random and computes xi = zri
mod N for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
2. P sends every xi to the verifier V.
3. V picks a random integer e ∈ {0, ..., B − 1} and sends it to P.
4. P computes y = r + e(N − φ(N)) and sends it to V.
5. V checks that 0 ≤ y < A and that zy−Nei = xi mod N for all i. If it
does not hold the protocol fails.
A detailed explanation of the protocol and the security proof, as well as
proofs about the soundness and the completeness of it, can be found in [41].
A.2.1 Integer Factorization Proof
We need to simulate the protocol without knowing the factorization of n. A
detailed description and proof of a simulation can be found in [41]. Alter-
natively, at the price of an equivocable commitment, we could simplify the
simulation as follows:
1. Follow the point of the protocol choosing a random er and yr and
compute xi = z
y−ne
i .
2. Receive e from the opponent. If e = er then the simulation could end,
otherwise rewind the opponent and change the pair er, yr. Repeat this
step until e = er
3. The opponent sends e again, the simulator sends y′.
Sketch. Clearly zy
′−ne = xi mod n and y′ < A holds by construction.
We observe that a good pair er, yr is obtained with probability
1
B and so the
complexity of all the simulation is lB.
A.3 Range Proof
We need two protocols to ensure that the share conversion protocol explained
in Section 2.5 will run correctly: one started by the initiator and the other
started by the receiver.
2φ is the Euler’s totient function that counts the positive integers up to a given integer
n that are relatively prime to n, while θ is the Bachmann-Landau symbol that means that
the argument is bounded both above and below.
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For the first one the common inputs are a Paillier public key (Γ, N),
the ciphertext c ∈ ZN2 , an RSA modulus M product of two safe primes,
and h1, h2 ∈ Z∗M . The prover knows m ∈ Zq and r ∈ Z∗N such that
c = ΓmrN mod N2 where q is the order of the group used during the share
conversion protocol previously described. At the end of the protocol the
verifier is convinced that m ∈ [−q3, q3].
The protocol works as follows:
1. P picks randomly α ∈ Zq3 , β ∈ Z∗N , γ ∈ Zq3M , ρ ∈ ZqM .
2. P computes z = hm1 h
ρ
2 mod M , u = Γ
αβN mod N2, and
ω = hα1h
γ
2 mod M .
3. P sends z, u and ω to V.
4. V picks e at random and sends it to P.
5. P computes s = reβ mod N , s1 = em+ α and s2 = eρ+ γ.
6. P sends s, s1 and s2 to V.
7. V checks if s1 ≤ q3, u = Γs1sNc−e mod N2 and hs11 hs22 = zeω mod M.
In the second protocol the prover wants to show that |b| ≤ q3 and that it
knows b, β′ such that gb = B and cB = (b×E cA)+EEA(y) (this second part
only during the Share Conversion Protocol with check). The common inputs
are B, the Pallier public key (Γ, N), and the ciphertexts c1, c2 (that are the
Paillier ciphertexts cA, cB). P also knows b ∈ Zq, y ∈ ZN and c2 = cb1ΓyrN
mod N2. The protocol works as follows:
1. P picks α ∈ Zq3 , ρ, σ, τ ∈ ZqM , ρ′ ∈ Zq3M , β, γ ∈ Z∗N uniformly at
random.
2. P computes:
• z = hb1hρ2 mod M,
• z′ = hα1hρ
′
2 mod M,
• t = hy1hσ2 mod M,
• u = gα,
• v = cα1ΓγβN mod N2,
• ω = hγ1hτ2 mod M .
3. P sends z, z′, t, v, ω, u to V.
4. V picks e ∈ Zq uniformly at random and sends it to P.
5. P computes:
34
• s = reβ mod N ,
• s1 = eb+ α,
• s2 = eρ+ ρ′,
• t1 = ey + γ,
• t2 = eσ + τ.
6. P sends s, s1, s2, t1 and t2 to V.
7. V checks if:
• s1 ≤ q3,
• gs1 = Beu,
• hs11 hs22 = zez′ mod M,
• ht11 ht22 = ωte mod M,
• cs11 sNΓt1 = ce2v mod N2.
For a security proof of this protocol see [16].
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